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THE PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS NEED TO KNOW
MORE ABOUT GOVERNMENT REGULATION
by Murray Weidenbaum
Testimony to the
Senate Committee on Government Affairs
Washington, DC
April 22, 1999

Thank you for the invitation to testify on S.59, the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999 and
on proposals for a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis. This legislation provides a superb
and unusual opportunity to raise the level of public understanding of an important and controversial
area of public policy. (1) S.59 accomplishes that desirable objective in a very straightforward and
nonpartisan manner: providing, on a regular basis, data on the benefits and costs of government
regulation. (2) Likewise, a new Office of Regulatory Analysis would give Congress an independent
source of information-provided its charter were broad enough for the task.

The Case for S.59
The reason S.59 is necessary is that neither the benefits nor the costs of compliance with
government regulation shows up in any measure of federal spending or taxation. But these effects
are very substantial-available estimates total hundreds of billions of dollars a year. The cost of
operating the federal regulatory establishment, according to the Center for the Study of American
Business, is reaching an all-time high of$18 billion in fiscal year 1999.
The public surely has a right to know this information on a consistent and regular basis. As a
former federal official, I know that such data would contribute to better-informed decision making
on key issues of public policy. Government regulation affects so many aspects of our economy and
society--economic factors such as employment, inflation, productivity, and competitiveness, as
well as social factors such as the environment, consumer and employee safety, and public health.
Some sections ofS.59 are especially noteworthy. Section 4(a) requires the President to trans-
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mit the regulatory data with the annual budget. That is an excellent idea, to help ensure that regulatory programs receive adequate attention in the key public and congressional deliberations on federal activity. As a practical matter, I hope that the full regulatory report would be included in the
accompanying volume of special analyses now covering credit programs, capital outlays, and other
important categories of federal activity-and that the President's budget message would present
the highlights.
As a general proposition, more information is better than less. Nevertheless, we must
acknowledge and respond to the criticisms that have been raised. It is true that S.59 will require
some modest expenditure of federal funds. But modest surely is the accurate description when we
compare the minimal requirements of this bill with the enormous existing structure for preparing
the estimates of federal revenues and expenditures.
A related criticism is that data on regulatory benefits and costs are not sufficiently reliable to
be worthy of dissemination. As someone who has pioneered the development of statistical information on regulation, I certainly am aware of the shortcomings that we have encountered-as well as
the progress that has been made. First of all, we should note that, to this day, strong criticism is also
leveled against the data on gross domestic product and other aggregate measures of economic activity. Nevertheless, officials in both the public sector and the private sector find that information
essential for their decision making.
Closer to home, there are well-known shortcomings in the budget data that Congress acts
upon. In the area of taxation, it takes several years after the fact for the Internal Revenue Service to
issue its key report, Statistics of Income. As a result, the historical revenue data contained in the
budget document, especially for the past year, are preliminary and subject to likely change. More
important, it is demonstrably difficult to estimate major portions of federal revenues under existing
tax law, especially capital gains taxes and corporate income taxes. On occasion, the Treasury's
projections are much too high or much too low. Similar problems arise on the expenditure side,
notably in the case of spending not tied directly to annual appropriations. Examples where budget
estimates can be way off range from the activities of the Commodity Credit Corporation to military
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procurement outlays to entitlements.
The shortcomings of the budget statistics notwithstanding, the nation still bases important
decisions on that information. Surely the available data on the benefits and costs of regulation,
whatever their limitations, have been very useful in alerting the public to the large magnitude of
resources that are involved and to the substantial range of impacts generated by regulatory activity.
I see no advantage in depriving the public of such knowledge.
Moreover, there is a positive feedback effect at work. For example, because the revenue estimates are so vital in the budget process, considerable effort has gone into improving the procedures
for estimating the various categories of federal taxation. The enactment of S.59 would provide a
similar incentive to improve the data on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. By making
permanent the now-temporary requirement for an annual regulatory accounting statement, S.59
would encourage the executive branch to devote additional resources to developing a regulatory
database.
From time to time, lawyers criticize economists who attempt to estimate values of a statistical
life for groups of individuals, data needed to quantify the impacts of some important regulatory
programs. Such criticism is surprising in view of the great frequency with which lawyers-when
they are in a courtroom-go far beyond such generalized statistics by introducing estimates of the
value of a specific human life and urging that large financial indemnities be based on such data.

A Few Procedural Points
On the positive side, I am delighted to see the details specified in Section 4(aXI). The OMB
reports in response to the Stevens Amendment, albeit helpful, have been deficient in providing data
on individual regulatory agencies and programs.

~ikewise,

the requirement for presenting recom-

mendations to reform government regulation should help to generate improvements in this important aspect of government activity.
On the other hand, including distributional effects generates a disproportionately large research requirement that would unduly burden and delay the entire effort to measure benefits and
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costs. On this score, I urge the Committee to consider the House version, which does not contain
this requirement. That treatment does not prevent the inclusion of distributional analyses, should
they become available. Section 4(a)(2) might be interpreted as requiring a very extensive research
effort in order to cover the indirect effects offederal rules. In terms of priority, estimating the costs
and benefits offederal regulatory programs should receive the great bulk of the effort and attention.
In contrast, the required analysis of direct and indirect impacts could rely on gathering relevant
studies already prepared by government and private researchers.
As a general proposition, restraint is needed in adding to the existing paperwork burden of the
regulatory review process, especially by avoiding items that are "nice to know," but where the
expected use is not likely to justify the burden of preparation. In that spirit, the relatively clean
Senate version of Section 4(c)(2) is preferable to the more extended version contained in Sections
4(c)(2) and 4(d)(2) of the House bill (H.R.2840).
However, there is merit in the proposal that estimates of costs and benefits be prepared for
several years following the year for which the basic report is being made. Given the new burden that
is being imposed by S.59 to prepare historical data, I suggest deferring and then phasing in the
requirement to provide estimates for the future.
Such advance warning would give the regulatory agencies the time needed to develop the
necessary new methodology. Aggregate benefit and cost projections might be required, say, in
2003, projections by agency in 2004, and estimates by program element in 2005.
Section 5(a)(2) requires OMB to consult with the Comptroller General before issuing the
annual report on regulation. The House bill names, instead, the director of the Congressional Budget Office. I am not impressed by either requirement but, if pressed, would lean toward the House
version.
In Section 6(a), a small procedural change would maintain a parallel relationship. The director
ofOMB should be required to consult with the chair ofthe Council ofEconomic Advisers. Both
officials, of course, are free to delegate some of this responsibility.
Section 7, on peer review, can be a useful innovation in both improving the regulatory data
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and in enhancing confidence in the data. Because peer reviews usually involve more than one
reviewer, I urge the committee to adopt the language ofH.R.l 074, which provides for two or more
reviewers. A number of public policy research organizations have the capability of performing the
task. Several of them have provided detailed analyses of the first two OMB annual reports on
regulatory benefits and costs.

A Proposed Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis
With an expanded flow of data on regulatory programs, it would be helpful if Congress had its
own expert staff to analyze such information and to prepare specific regulatory studies on its own.
Legislation to establish a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis is an appropriate companion
to S.59. However, the specific proposals that I have seen do not go far enough, although in some
minor regard they may go too far.
Virtually all generic regulatory reform proposals fqcus on improving the way in which government agencies write regulations to carry out laws already enacted. Although such change is
needed, this approach ignores the compelling fact that the key decisions on government regulation
occur earlier in the process-when Congress writes an Occupational Safety and Health Act or an
amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act or any other important regulatory law.
Each congressional committee, when drafting a regulatory statute, should present estimates of
the expected benefits and costs of the regulatory program in the report accompanying the legislation. To the extent feasible, this report should include a monetary evaluation of costs and benefits as
well as a description of other advantages and disadvantages of the regulatory proposal.
To help it carry out reviews of proposed regulatory laws and rules, Congress should establish
its own professional, nonpartisan regulatory analysis organization to provide it with reliable data,
including estimates of benefits and costs. This organization could be a part of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). That would both minimize overhead costs and enable the new office to
become operational more quickly.
In carrying out their respective functions, it would be helpful ifOIRA (the regulatory office of

5

:

OMB) and its new congressional counterpart developed a cooperative attitude on exchanging statistical and technical information, consistent with the separation of powers between legislative and
executive branches. Such an effort would be similar to existing cooperation between CBO and

-

OMB on budget matters.

On the other hand, the new congressional regulatory office should be careful not to intrude
into the process of executive branch drafting of regulations. Rather, as noted above, it should focus
on the earlier stage where Congress is considering a new regulatory statute and also on the later
stage where Congress is reviewing a proposed regulation under the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREF A).
Additional analysis of these points is contained in the attached copy of the recent report of the
. Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing Government Regulation (I served as project
director for the CED report).

Conclusion
In summary, the enactment ofS.59 and of a bill to establish a Congressional Office ofRegulatory Analysis would be important improvements in the federal regulatory system. It is especially
gratifying to see the bipartisan nature of these bills and of their congressional supporters. Their
enactment would raise the information level of deliberations on regulation-and might even lower
the decibel level.

Murray Weidenbaum is chairman ofthe Center for the Study ofAmerican Business and Mallinckrodt
Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. In 1980, he chaired
President-elect Ronald Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Reform and served on the Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief in 1981-82. In 1998, he wrote A New Approach to Regulatory
Reform. The views expressed are entirely personal.
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